1. The Competitive Model of the Labour Market: a Tale of Demand and Supply (hints)

2. Efficiency Wages:
   2.1 Adverse Selection: the Role of the Solow Condition
   2.2 Moral Hazard: the Shirking Model

3. The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment

4. Implicit Contracts

5. Hiring and Firing Costs: a Dynamic Model of the Labour Market

Each of the three scheduled lectures will be two about hours and half long, unless otherwise stated. Students are supposed to be proficient with static and dynamic optimization and have a basic knowledge of Markov processes.

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References


